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A BROADER APPROACH TO THE SUBSTANTIAL
TRUTH DEFENSE
A good reputation is valued in our society.' Accordingly, the law recognizes the tort
action of defamation 2 in order to compensate a person when his or her reputation is
damaged in the estimation of others. 3 To establish a prima facie case of defamation, the
plaintiff must show that. the words which allegedly caused the reputational damage may
be interpreted as defamatory.'' The plaintiff also must show that the words reached at
least one other person and that this person reasonably understood the words to be
defamatory. 5 Furthermore, the plaintiff must allege that the defendant was at minimum
negligent in making the challenged statements.' Finally, to complete the prima facie
case, the plaintiff must show that the challenged statements are false.?
Consistent with the idea that defamation must consist of a false, derogatory state-
ment., the literal truth of an otherwise defamatory statement was historically a complete
defense to a defamation action. 8 Because it is virtually impossible to prove the literal
truth of every expression published, however, courts recognized that the literal truth
requirement placed a particularly heavy burden on media defendants in defamation
actions." Consequently, courts developed the "substantial truth" defense. This defense
I PROSSER AND KEE'roN ON TORTS § 113, at 804 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter Pitosseal.
2 Defamation is a generic term covering both libel (essentially written defamation) and slander
(essentially spoken defamation). Because of the often intricate and blurred distinctions between
libel and slander, this note uses the more general term defamation to describe both torts. Some
courts also ignore these differences and apply the same rules to both libel and slander. E.g.,
O'Donnell v. Field Enters., 145 III. App. 3d 1032, 1036 n.2, 491 N.E.2d 1212, 1215 n.2 (1986)
("[A111 distinctions between libel and slander, except as to whether the defamation was written or
spoken, have been abolished and the rules applicable to slander are now applicable to libel as
3 Dean Prosser defines damage to reputation as that which tends to "diminish the esteem,
respect, goodwill or confidence in which the plaintiff' is held, or to excite adverse, derogatory or
unpleasant feelings or opinions against him lor her]." PROSSER, supra note 1, § 111, at 773. See also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) or TORTS § 559 COMIFICHI. b (1977) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
4 See PROSSER, SRAM note 1, § 113, at, 802. In order to he capable of' a defamatory interpretation,
the court must find that the challenged statement would produce reputational damage. Id. § 1 II,
at 781.
5 Id. § 113, at 797-98. See also REsTATEmENT, supra note 3, at § 558(b).
See generally PROSSER, supra note I, § 113, at 803; ResTATENiemr, supra note 3, at § 558(c).
7 See jadwin v. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 390 N.W.2d 437, 440 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
In a minority of states it is possible for a true statement to be defamatory if it is published maliciously
for no legitimate reason other than to hurt someone. PROSSER, supra note 1, § 116; RESTATEMENT,
supra note 3, at § 581A, comment a. In general, however, the statement must be false and also must
be capable of a defamatory meaning. Pitossrat, supra note I, at § 116; RESTATEMENT, supra note 3,
at § 58IA, comment a. A plaintiff cannot bring a defamation action simply because the plaintiff
finds the statement personally objectionable. Johnson v. Dirkswager, 315 N.W.20 215, 218 (Minn.
1982); Bubb v. Kraybill, 354 Pa. Super. 361, 365-66, 511 A.2d 1379, 1381 (1986), appeal denied,
513 Pa. 633, 520 A.2d 1384 (1987); Stones River Motors, Inc. v. Mid-South Publishing Co., 651
S.W.2d 713, 719 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983); RESTATEMENT', supra note 3, at § 566.
8 See C. LAWHORNE, THE SUPREME Coua'r AND LIBEL 2-3 (1981); Franklin, The Origins and
Constitutionality of Limitations on Truth as a Defense in Tort Law, 16 STAN. L. REV. 789, 790-91 (1964).
9 E.g., Jackson v. Pittsburgh Times, 152 Pa. 406, 412, 25 A. 613, 615 (1893) ("It is not necessary
to he correct in every word ... that is not common sense, and could not be done [by a newspaper].").
See also It, SANFORD, SYNOPSIS OF THE LAW (IF LIBEL AND 'rite RIGHT OF PRIVACY 16 (1981). This
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eases 1 " the defendant's burden of proof by allowing concededly untrue statements to
bar recovery if the statements are close enough to the literal truth to be "substantially
true.""
In determining whether a statement is truthful enough to be a defense to a defa-
mation claim, courts analyze the defamatory statement's effect on the mind of the average
reader or listener.' 2 If the court concludes that the difference between the literal truth
and the defamatory statement is inconsequential in the mind of the average recipient,
the defendant is not liable for any damage caused by the statement.' 3 Although all courts
that have adopted the substantial truth defense focus on the statement's effect on the
recipient, courts use differing approaches to determine to what extent a statement may
deviate from the literal truth and still remain "substantially" true. Originally, courts
relaxed the defense of truth to allow only minor inaccuracies of expression, such as
incorrectly describing the color of a person's car, to withstand a defamation action."
This restrictive approach still is employed in a majority of jurisdictions. 15
As the substantial truth defense evolved, however, other courts applied this "defa-
matory effect" test with increasingly liberal interpretations of the standard. These courts
extended the range of the defense to cover exaggerations of an otherwise true state-
ment.'" For example, these courts would find that an account of a theft charging that
plaintiff stole $50,000 would be substantially true if the defendant proved that the
plaintiff stole only $500.' 7 Recently, in Shihab a. Express Newts Corp.,'" a Texas appellate
court extended the substantial truth defense even further by allowing proof of a different
but equally opprobrious action to satisfy the substantial truth requirement. The Shihab
court stressed that a defamation action should turn on whether the plaintiff's reputation
note deals primarily with media defendants as many defamation actions involve the media. The
defense of' substantial truth is, however, equally applicable to all defamation defendants.
'" See, e.g., Gomba v. McLaughlin, 180 Colo. 232, 236, 504 P.2d 337. 338-39 (197'2).
" Williams v. WCAU-TV, 555 F. Supp. 198, 202 (E.D. Pa. 1983); Fairbanks Publishing Co. v.
Pitka, 376 17.2d 190, 193 (Alaska 1962); Fendler v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 130 Ariz. 474, 479,
636 P.2d 1257, 1261 (1981); Goodrich v. Waterbury Republican-American, 188 Conn. 107, 112-
13, 448 A.2d 1317, 1322 (1982).
12 Combo, 180 Colo. at 236, 504 P.2d at 339; Strada v. Connecticut Newspapers, Inc., 193 Conn.
313, 322, 477 A.2d 1005, 1010 (1984); Gannett Co. v. Re, 496 A.2d 553, 557 (Del. 1985); Crites v.
Mullins, 697 S.W.2d 715, 717 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985).
Crites, 697 S.W.2d al 717.
14 E.g., Conner v. Standard Publishing Co., 183 Mass. 474, 477-78, 67 N.E. 596, 597 (1903)
(whether horse is bay or white insignificant).
15 See infra note 39 for a list of states that follow the substantial truth defense today. The author
has assigned labels to each approach — slight inaccuracies, exaggeration, and Shihab — for ease of
discussion; these are not commonly used labels. Courts generally do not explain what approach
they are using and the cases may not always lit neatly under one approach or another.
Twenty-seven states use the "slight inaccuracies" approach. See infra text accompanying notes
43-74 for a discussion of cases following the "slight inaccuracies" approach. Although seventeen
of the twenty-seven states use this standard exclusively, seven of the twenty-seven states also use
the "exaggeration" approach.
1 ' E.g., Crites, 697 S.W.2d at 717 ("A showing of substantial truth will defeat an allegation of
libel, even where the misconduct charged may be exaggerated, if no more opprobrium would be
attached to appellant's actions merely because of such exaggeration."); Fort Worth Press Co. v.
Davis, 96 S.W.2d 416, 419 (1930) (substantial truth defense allowed where plaintiff wasted $17,500
of taxpayers' money, riot $80,000 as charged, because the court concluded that the sting of defa-
mation was the charge of wasting money not the amount wasted).
' 7
 Weisburgh v. Mahady, 147 Vt. 70,	 511 A.2d 304, 306 (1980).
' 8 604 S.W.2d 204 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980).
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actually was damaged in the minds of the recipients, not on how consistent the defa-
matory statement was with the truth."
This note examines the common law development of' the defense of substantial truth
and asserts that the approach used by the Shiltab court correctly moves toward a more
appropriate approach to applying the defense. Section I will focus on the evolution of
the defense, including, in subsection A, both its historical development 2" and the rela-
tionship between the common law defamation action and the first amendment's guar-
antee of freedom of speech." Subsection will analyze the differing approaches courts
use today in applying the substantial truth defense. 22 Section II will examine the rationale
for further expansion of the substantial truth delense. 23 This note will conclude that the
Shilutb court's approach, where different though equally opprobrious actions satisfy the
substantial truth defense, is the appropriate and desirable approach 10 applying the
defense.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SUBSTANTIAL TRUTH DEFENSE IN DEFAMATION Ac'rIoNs
A. Common Law and Constitutional Evolution of the Defense of Substantial Truth
Anglo-American defamation law traces its roots to the middle ages. The civil defa-
mation cause of action developed from the English criminal defamation actions that
began in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries." The king's courts established criminal
penalties for verbal attacks on the reputations of the "great magnates of the realm," as
such disputes often led to violence rather than resolution in a local or church court. 2 '
Under the De Scandalis Magnatum, enacted in 1275, and in the deliberations of the Court
of Star Chamber, truth was not a defense to a criminal defamation action because
accuracy did not necessarily prevent "breaches of the king's peace" by those who had
been defained. 26 By the late seventeenth century, however, courts accepted the idea that
truth was a complete defense in criminal defamation actions. 27
1"Id. at 208.
2"See infra notes 24-33 and accompanying text.
21 See infra notes 39-38 and accompanying text.
22 See infra notes 39-107 and accompanying text.
23 See infra notes 108-36 and accompanying text.
24 See generally N. ROSENBERG, PROTECTING THE BEST MEN: AN INTERPRETIVE HISTORY or 'HIE
LAW OF LIBEL 3-4 (1986).
21 1d. at 4.
2" Id. at 4-5. The be Scandals Magnatum declared that slandering the great. men of England
was a crime. Id. at 4. The Star Chamber was a notorious body of judges who illegally exceeded
their authority, especially by enforcing the king's arbitrary pronouncements. BLACK'S LAW DIC-
TIONARY 1261 (5th ed. 1979). Before it was abolished in 1641, the Star Chamber defined the basic
concepts of criminal libel which the common law courts adopted. ROSENBERG, .supra note 24, at 4—
5.
27 LAWHORNE, supra note 8, at xvi. Apparently the defense of truth was first recognized in
American law iu 1692 for criminal defamation in the first recorded case against a newspaper
printer. Id. In this break from the previously accepted English law, the Quaker judges in Philadelphia
allowed one of the defendants to submit evidence of the truth as justification for the criminal libel
charge. Id. Truth finally entered the forefront of defamation law in 1735 in the widely publicized
trial of publisher John Peter Zenger. Id. at xvi—xvii. The jurors found that Zenger had published a
criticism of Governor William Cosby as alleged, but inure importantly the jurors also found that
the criticism was true and hence not li belo Id. at xvii.
The Sedition Law, passed a Few years after the First. :intendment to the United States Consti-
tution was adopted, criminalized defamatory statements concerning the government. Id. at 2.
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Criminal defamation actions gradually gave way to civil defamation actions when
injured plaintiffs began demanding compensation for the damage caused to their rep-
utations." Although courts were slower to adopt truth as a complete defense in civil
defamation cases, by the late eighteenth or early nineteenth century most courts did
allow the defendant to assert truth as a defense." At this time, courts required the
defendant to prove the literal truth of the communication to establish the defense."
Courts imposed this difficult burden on the defendant partly because of the strong
traditional presumption in favor of the plaintiff that a person has a right to have his or
her reputation undamaged by false statements."
Despite this traditional view, the literal truth requirement gradually gave way to the
substantial truth defense. This defense eased the difficult burden of justifying each
challenged statement by allowing proof of the substantial truth of each statement to
defeat liability. 32
 The defense developed both from the common law equitable notion
that it is unfair to require the defendant to justify every insignificant detail," as well as
Although this law abridged first amendment rights, it explicitly approved of the defense of truth
in actions brought under the Sedition Law. Id. By the time the Sedition Law expired in 1801, three
years after its enactment, truth as a complete defense had been adopted in most state laws and
constitutions, and accepted by the courts. Id. at 3.
2' See ROSENBERG, supra note 24, at 5. Another reason that criminal defamation actions fell into
disuse in the United States is that colonial juries refused to indict publishers for defamatory attacks
on the government. See LAWHORNE, supra note 8, at 1 & n.4.
29
 The history of the defense of truth in civil defamation actions is uncertain. Ray, Truth: A
Defense to Libel, 16 MINN. L. REV. 43, 49 (1931). Professor Ray uses Townsend's explanation, in
TOWNSEND, SLANDER & LIBEL (3d.), of the early civil defamation law. Ray, supra, at 49.
Scholars are split over whether truth was always a defense to defamation. Id. One commentator
suggests that the beginning of the common law rule allowing truth as a defense in civil actions
occurred around 1716 after the passage of the Statute of Anne. id. at 50. Until about 1735, however,
this statute only allowed defendants to plead truth in mitigation, not as a complete defense. Id. at
50-51. Sometime after 1735, though, truth acted as a complete defense. Id. at 51. Another com-
mentator maintains that truth has been a complete defense in English civil defamation cases for
centuries and that the American states early adopted this rule. Franklin, supra note 8, at 790-91,
About the same time that truth became firmly recognized by many courts as a complete defense
in both criminal and civil defamation actions, statutes and state constitutional provisions were
enacted to expressly adopt truth as a defense. In 1790, for example, Pennsylvania added a consti-
tutional provision which allowed the admission of truth as evidence in a criminal defamation action.
See Ray, supra, at 46 n.16. By 1799, Kentucky, Tennessee, Ohio, and New Jersey bad followed suit.
Id.
Gomba v. McLaughlin, 180 Colo. 232, 236, 504 P.2d 337, 338 (1973); Tschirgi v. Lander
Wyoming State Journal, 706 P.2d 1116, 1120 (Wyo. 1985). See M. NEWELL, THE LAW OE SLANDER
AND LIBEL § 956 (3d. ed. 1914).
See SANFORD, supra note 9, at 7 ("The law has recognized for centuries that every person has
a right to have the estimation in which he stands in the opinion of others unaffected by false
statements to his discredit.").
" 2
 PROSSER, supra note 1, § 116, at 842 ("Mt is not necessary to prove the literal truth of the
accusation in every detail, and ... it is sufficient to show that the imputation is substantially true,
or as it is often put, to justify the 'gist,' the 'sting,' or the 'substantial truth' of the defamation."
(citations omitted)).
" E.g., Tschirgi, 706 P.2d at 1120 ("Increasingly courts have recognized that injustice often
resulted from requiring literal or precise accuracy in a statement, and the trend has been toward a
relaxing of' this requirement."). While substantial truth is primarily a common law defense, a large
majority of states have enacted constitutional or statutory provisions declaring the right of a
defendant to present evidence of truth as a bar to a criminal or a civil defamation action. See, e.g.,
DEL. CONST. art. I, § 5 (criminal); Iowa CoNsT. art. I, § 7 (criminal); DEL. CODE ANN. Lit. 10, § 3919
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the recognition that the first amendment guaranteed defendants certain freedom of
speech rights.
Although the United States Supreme Court has never directly addressed the com-
mon law defense of substantial truth," the Court has recognized the tension between
the policies underlying the defamation laws, and the freedom of speech and of the press
guaranteed by the first amendment." The Court has stated that it is necessary to balance
(1975). The Pennsylvania statute specifically mentions the substantial truth defense. See 42 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8342 (Purdon 1982). This statute, originally enacted in 1901, reads as follows:
In all civil actions for libel, the plea of justification shall he accepted as an adequate
and complete defense, when it is pleaded, and proved to the satisfaction of the jury
. . . that the publication is substantially tow and is proper for public information or
investigation, and has not been maliciously or negligently made.
Id. (emphasis added). Other states refer only to truth in their statutes or constitutional provisions,
but allow substantial truth to satisfy the defense through common law interpretations. For example,
Virginia's statute states: In any action for defamation, the defendant nay justify by alleging and
proving that the words spoken or written were true . ." VA. CODE ANN. b 8.01-46 (1984) (emphasis
added). The Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals (currently the Virginia Supreme Court), however,
in 1956 interpreted under the corresponding provision of former law that "Isilight inaccuracies of
expression are immaterial." Saleeby v. Free Press, 197 Va. 761, 763. 91 S.E.2d 405, 407 (1956),
The court continued that a statement need only be "substantially" true. Id. See infra note 39 for a
list of states recognizing the substantial truth defense.
54 See generally Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 137 (1967) (Court distinguished
the substantial truth defense from constitutional defenses and discussed only the constitutional
claims).
The Supreme Court has addressed the question of which party to a defamation action has the
burden of proving the truth or falsity of a defamatory statement. The burden of proof under the
substantial truth defense has been a widely debated issue. Originally, courts required the defendant
to affirmatively raise the defense of truth. PRossER, supra note 1, § 116, at 839. Following the
Supreme Court decision in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), some courts shifted the
burden to the plaintiff to prove the falsity of a statement, while other courts maintained that the
defendant still carried the burden of proof. See Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 106 S. Ct.
1558, 1561 n.2 (1986).
Recently in tfepps, the Supreme Court declared in a five-to-four decision that for actions
involving public issues, the plaintiff bears a' constitutionally mandated burden to prove the falsity
of the defamatory material. Id. at 1563. The Court determined that where the issue involved is one
of public concern, the common law presumption of falsity is inapplicable, whether the plaintiff is
a public or private figure. Id. at 1563, 1564. In fact, the substantial truth defense bypasses the
constitutional issues raised in such landmark decisions as New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254 (1964), and 67rtz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). Both New York Times and Gertz
addressed the level of media fault that certain plaintiffs must establish in order to recover for
reputational damage, The standard of fault developed first in New York Times, the "actual malice"
standard, involves false statements of fact made by the media concerning the plaintiff, New York
Times, 376 U.S. at 256. Actual malice is a standard that a public official, id, at 279-80, or public
figure, Bulls, 388 U.S. at 155, must prove before he or she can recover damages for a false and
defamatory statement. The Court defined actual malice as a false statement made "with knowledge
that it was false or with reckless disregard or whether it was false or not." New York Times, 376 U.S.
at 279-80. Therefore, if the court determines that the statement is true or substantially true, i.e.
that it is not false, it is unnecessary for the court to reach the constitutional actual malice concerns.
Ex„ Sivulich v. Howard Publications, 126 III. App. 3d 129, 130, 466 N.E.2d 1218, 1219 (1984);
Tschirgi v. Lander Wyoming State journal, 706 P.2d 1116, 1118 (Wyo. 1985).
" The first amendment to the United States Constitution provides: "Congress shall make no
law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and the
petition the Government for it redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
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the individual's right to his or her reputation with the media's freedom to publish
disparaging continents without fear of suit." The Court has noted that it is "especially
anxious" to assure that the freedoms of speech and press are given essential "breathing
space." 37
 To that end, the Court has reasoned that rules that unduly burden media
defendants are inconsistent with the first amendment because they promote media self-
censorship and stifle vigorous discussion of public issues and concerns." In accordance
with these Supreme Court concerns, state courts developed the defense of substantial
truth to ease the burden on media defendants and accommodate their right to freedoms
of speech and press.
In sum, civil defamation actions developed from the early criminal actions. Initially
courts allowed only the literal truth to act as a defense to a defamation charge. Gradually,
however, through recognition of the media defendant's first amendment rights and the
difficult burden of proving the literal truth, courts allowed defendants to escape liability
if the defamatory statement was "substantially true."
B. Application of the Substantial Truth Defame
Today at least forty-one states recognize the common law defense of substantial
truth. 39
 Each of these jurisdictions determines the substantial truth by looking to the
36 See, e.g., Gertz, 418 U.S. at 341; Butts, 388 U.S. at 153.
37 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 342.
se Id. at 340-41; New York Times, 376 U.S. at 278-79.
See Johnson Publishing Co. v, Davis, 271 Ala. 474, 487, 124 So. 2d 441, 450 (1960); Fairbanks
Publishing Co. v. Pitka, 376 P.2d 190, 193 (Alaska 1962); Fendler v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 130
Ariz. 475, 479, 636 P.2d 1257, 1261 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981); Pritchard v. Times Southwest Broad-
casting, Inc., 277 Ark. 458, 463, 642 S.W.2d 877, 879 (1982); Emde v. San Joaquin County Cent.
Labor Council, 23 Cal. 2d 146, 160, 143 P.2d 20, 28 (1943); Gomba v. McLaughlin, 180 Colo. 232.
236, 504 P.2d 337, 339 (1972); Goodrich v. Waterbury Republican-American, Inc., 188 Conn. 107.
113, 448 A.2d 1317, 1322 (1982); Gannett Co. v. Re, 496 A.2d 553, 557 (Del. 1985); Florida
Publishing Co. v. Lee, 76 Ha. 405, 411-12, 80 So. 245, 246 (1918); Jones v. Neighbor Newspapers,
inc., 142 Ga. App. 365, 369, 236 S.E.2d 23, 25 (1977); Kohn v. West Hawaii Today, Inc., 65 Haw.
584, 590-91, 656 P.2d 79, 84 (1982); Baker v. Burlington Northern, lnc., 99 Idaho 688, 690, 587
P.2c1 829, 831 (1978); Sivulich v. Howard Publications, Inc., 126 III. App. 3d 129, 131, 466 N.E.2d
1218, 1220 (1984); Wallord v. Herald Printing & Publishing Co., 133 Ind. 372, 373-74, 32 N.E.
929, 929 (1893); Hovey v. Iowa State Daily Publication Bd., Inc., 372 N.W.2d 253, 256 (Iowa 1985);
Hein v. Lacy, 228 Kan. 249, 259, 616 P.2d 277, 284 (1980); Pearce v. Courierjournal, 683 S.W.2d
633, 635 (Ky. Ct. App. 1985); Batiste v. Guiteau, 413 So. 2d 559, 563 (La. Ct. App. 1982); Picard
v, Brennan, 307 A.2d 833, 835 (Me. 1973); Conner v. Standard Publishing Co., 183 Mass. 474,
477, 67 N.E. 596, 597 (1903); Hayes v. Booth Newspapers, Inc., 97 Mich. App. 758, 777, 295
N.W.2d 858, 867 (1980); jadwin v. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 390 N.W.2d 437, 441 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1986); Smith v. Byrd, 225 Miss. 331, 334-35, 83 So. 2d 172, 175 (1955); Turnbull v.
Herald Co., 459 S.W.2d 516, 519 (Mo. Ct. App. 1970); Chagnon v. Union-Leader Co., 103 N.H.
426, 437, 174 A.2d 825, 833 (1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 830 (1962); Hermann v. Newark Morning
Ledger Co., 48 N.J. Super. 420, 431-32, 138 A.2d 61, 67 (1958); Coronado Credit Union v. Koat
Television, Inc., 99 N.M. 233, 238, 656 P.2d 896, 901 (N.M. Ct. App. 1982); Korkala v. W.W.
Norton & Co., 618 F. Supp. 152, 155 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Dental Care Clinic v. McDonough, No.
50242, (Ohio Ct. App. May 8, 1986); Akins v. Altus Newspapers, Inc., 609 P.2d 1263, 1266 (Old.
1977); Shirley v. Freunscht, 81 Or. App. 221, 224, 724 1'.2d 907, 910 (1986); Bobb v. Kraybill, 354
Pa. Super. 361, 366, 511 A.2d 1379, 1381 (1986), appeal denied, 513 Pa. 633, 520 A.2d 1384 (1987);
Ross v. Columbia .Newspapers, Inc., 266 S.C. 75, 80, 221 S.E.2d 770, 772 (1976); Windsor v.
Tennessean, 654 S.W.2c1 680, 686 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983); Downer v. Amalgamated Meatcutters &
Butcher Workmen of N. Am., 550 5.W.2d 744, 747 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977); Weisburgh v. Mahady,
147 Vt. 70, 511 A.2d 304, 306 (1986); Saleeby v. Free Press, 197 Va. 761, 763, 91 S.E.2d 405,
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defamatory statement's effect on the mind of the average reader or listener. 4° If the
effect of the "substantially true" defamatory statement is the same or relatively the same
as a true defamatory statement, the defendant will not be found liable.rn In general,
determining the effect the del'amatory statement has on the mind of the recipient is a
question of fact for the factfinder. 42
 Despite the widespread recognition of this standard,
courts use different approaches in applying it. Each approach defines how far an al-
legedly defamatory statement may deviate from the truth before a different effect on
the reader or listener results, thus defeating the substantial truth defense.
1. The "Slight Inaccuracies" Approach to the Substantial Truth Defense
The first courts to use the substantial truth defense did not expressly state that they
were deviating from the previous literal truth requirement. As early as 1890, however,
one court impliedly approved the substantial truth defense by recognizing that•only the
"material" elements of the alleged defamation must be true to defeat liability.'" By 1893,
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in Jackson v. Pittsburgh Times, affirmed a judgment
for a newspaper defendant on the, express grounds that the defamatory article was
substantially true.." In this case, the defendant printed an account of a light in a flood
407 (1956); Mark v. Seattle Times, 96 Wash. 2d 473, 494, 635 1 2.2d 1081, 1092 (1981); Kinney v.
Daniels, 574 F. Supp. 542, 546 (S.D.W, Va. 1983); Gerol v. Arena, 127 Wis. 2d 1, 7, 377 N.W.2d
618, 620-21 (Wis. Ct.. App, 1985); Tschirgi v, Lander Wyoming State Journal, 706 P.2d 1116, 1120
(Wyo, 1985).
4° See, e.g., Williams v. WCAU-TV, 555 F. Supp. 198, 202 (E.D, Pa. 1983) ("A statement is
substantially accurate if its 'gist' or 'sting' is true, that is, if it produces the same effect on the mind
of the recipient which the precise truth would have produced."); Crites, 697 S.W.2d at 717 ("The
critical lest is the effect on the mind of the reader or listeners ......).
." See, e.g., Femller, 130 Ariz. at 479, 636 P.2d at 1261; Kohn, 65 Haw. at 590-91, 65(1 12 .2d at
38-84,
42 Kohn, 65 Haw, at 591, 656 P,2d at 84; Fields Found., Ltd. v. Christensen, 103 Wis. 2d 465,
584, 309 N.W.2d 125, 135 (Wis. Ct. App. 1981); RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, at 617(b) ("Subject
to the control of the court whenever the issue arises, the jury determines whether ... (b) the matter
was true or false."). Contra Routh v. Enquirer & News of Battle Creek, 137 Mich. App. 39, 43 n.2,
357 N.W.2c1 794, 797 n.2 (1984) (substantial truth is a question of law for the judge).
Sonic courts determine that the issue of substantial truth is an appropriate question of law on
summary judgment when there is no dispute to the facts underlying the issue of truth or falsity of
the statement. E.g., Williams v INCA U-TV, 555 F. Supp. 198, 203 (E.1). Pa. 1983); Fendler, 130
Ariz. at 480, 636 P.2d at 1262; Downer, 550 S.W.2d at 746.
1 ' Republican Publishing Co. v. Mosman, 15 Colo. 399, 410, 24 P. 1051, 1055 (1890).
4 ' 152 Pa. 406, 25 A. 613 (1893). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court approved of the trial court's
explanation of the law to the jury: "It is not necessary to be correct in every word, ... that is not
common sense, and could not be done; nobody could conduct a paper if' that were so, but the law
is that it has to be in lair and substantial account of the occurrence." /d. at 412, 25 A. at 615. The
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts approved of a similar lower court jury instruction in
Conner v. Standard Publishing Co., 183 Mass. 474, 67 N.E. 596 (1903). The court stated:
I don't say that the defamatory statenients1 must be actually and literally true, because
the difference may be a difference of no consequence. Suppose I should charge sonic
man with stealing a bay horse, and, when 1 come to court to testify, it should prove
to be a white horse; there would be no earthly difference in the charge, and I should
prove it substantially if 1 should prove that the horse was a white horse, instead of' a
bay horse.
Id. at 477-78, 67 N.E. at 597.
Other courts around the turn of the century followed this approach. See, e.g., Mathews v.
Detroit Journal Co., 123 Mich. 608, 609, 82 N.W. 243, 243 (1900); Sacchctti v. Fehr, 217 Pa. 475,
476, 06 A. 742, 742 (1907).
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stricken town between the plaintiff, a national guardsman who was drunk at the time of
the fight, and a sheriff who lost his family in the flood. 45 The newspaper sensationalized
the dialogue between the two combatants, casting the plaintiff as the drunken ruffian
and his opponent as the righteous, bereaved flood survivor. 16 Although the newspaper
printed an incorrect name for the sheriff, the court dismissed this as insignificant. 47
Furthermore, because there was evidence both that the plaintiff had been drinking and
that an altercation between the two had taken place, the court deemed the substance of
the article was close enough to the truth to defeat a defamation action. 48
Since these early decisions, courts consistently have allowed minor inaccuracies in a
story's insignificant details to establish the substantial truth defense. Most courts reason
that these "slight inaccuracies" are not sufficient to make an otherwise true defamatory
statement actionable.'w Courts have primarily applied this approach in cases where an
incorrect though similar word is used to describe an incident. For example, in one case
the defendant newspaper published an article that incorrectly reported that official
documents accused the physician-plaintiff of improperly prescribing Demerol." The
court noted that the document actually said "controlled substances," not "llemerol.""
Nevertheless, the court found that the article was substantially true, despite this inac-
curacy, because there was no appreciable difference in the defamatory effect on the
reader of a statement that accused a physician of dispensing Demerol versus dispensing
controlled substances. 52
Similarly, if the defendant misuses a technical term that the ordinary reader or
listener would not be able to distinguish from the correct usage of the term, courts find
that the inaccuracy is not enough to render the statement false•" An example would be
substituting the word "burglary" for "larceny." Because the average person does not
know the technical distinctions between the two terms, this inaccuracy would fall within
the reach of the "slight inaccuracy" approach to applying the substantial truth defense."
The substantial truth defense generally fails, however, in states adhering to the
"slight inaccuracies" approach if the defamatory charge made against the plaintiff is one
of persistent misconduct, but the plaintiff committed the misconduct on only one occa-
"Jackson, 152 Pa. at 407-10, 25 A. at 613-14.
" Id.
17 Id. at 411, 25 A. at 614.
" Id.
19 This note has labelled this first group of cases the "slight inaccuracies" approach because the
courts generally interpret the substantial truth defense to include only minor inaccuracies of
expression or detail.
5" Pearce v. Courier-Journal, 683 S.W.2d 633, 635 (Ky. Ct. App. 1985).
" Id.
" Id. See also Flovey v. Iowa State Daily Publications Bd., 372 N.W.2d 253, 255 (Iowa 1985)
(article stating plaintiff was raped substantially true when in fact she was forced to perform oral
sex); Tschirgi v. Lander Wyoming State Journal, 706 P.2d 1116, 1120-21 (Wyo. 1985) (report that
plaintiff was wrestled to ground by police substantially true when in fact he was wrestled against
car).
"See generally RESTATEMENT, .supra note 3, at 581A comment f.
54 See id. See also Siuulich, 126 III. App. 3d at 132. 466 N.E.2d at 1220 (article stating that charges
of "aggravated battery," a felony, filed against plaintiff was substantially true given that common
usage of "aggravated" means more severe, and the actual complaint against plaintiff alleged a
violent and malicious battery); Windsor v. Tennessean, 654 S.W.2d 680, 686 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983)
(immaterial that newspaper stated plaintiff "signed" a subpoena, when he actually "issued" a
subpoena, because average reader would not know mechanics by which subpoenas are issued).
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sion.55
 Thus, one court found that showing that the plaintiff was convicted once for
transporting women for the purpose of prostitutiOn did not prove the truth of a state-
ment that the plaintiff was a "pimp." 5" Similarly, another court held that proof of
infidelity on one occasion was not enough to justify calling a woman a "dirty old whore."" 7
Courts also do not allow the defendant to use the substantial truth defense under
the "slight inaccuracies" approach when a socially unacceptable act is attributed incor-
rectly to the plaintiff instead of the actual actor. For example, the Massachusetts Court
of Appeals has held that the substantial truth defense will not protect the media defen-
dant who communicates all the details of a crime substantially accurately but then
incorrectly identifies the plaintiff as the perpetrator." In the 1979 case of Liguori v.
Republican Co., the Republican, a newspaper, required its reporters to give a street address
of all defendants listed in any report of a judicial proceeding." A reporter gathering
information about "Anthony Liguori," who had changed his plea in a criminal conspiracy
charge from not guilty to guilty, incorrectly used the street address of the plaintiff', a
different "Anthony Liguori."" The court found the newspaper liable concluding that
an article that incorrectly identifies a person who in fact had nothing to do with the
clinic is "neither fair nor accurate.""'
Even in situations where the content of the alleged defamation is essentially correct,
and the plaintiff is correctly identified, the defendant may not be able to rely on the
substantial truth defense. For example, in. the 1985 case of Cannel Co. v. Re, the sub-
stantial truth defense failed where a detail was omitted from a statement that would
have reduced the statement's defamatory impact."2 In Connell, a reporter for the defen-
dant newspaper wrote an article concerning the plaintiff's indictment for charges of
securities fraud, theft, attempted theft and conspiracy stemming from the plaintiff's
attempt to finance an invention." The court found that the article's account of all these
charges was accurate.'" The reporter concluded the article by discussing a demonstration
of another invention, an airpowered car, that the plaintiff had conducted for the media
nearly two years before." The reporter stated that, in the demonstration the car never
started when in fact it had started, although only after repeated attempts, and traveled
one-quarter mile at a speed of 10 miles per hour." The newspaper contended that the
truth was more damaging to the plaintiff's reputation than saying the car failed to start."'
The court reasoned, however, that this final inaccurate statement in the context of the
article concerning plaintiff's indictment for fraud and other charges lent a note of
validity to the charges against plaintiff by implying that he had been deceitful on other
" See PRossiut. supra note 1, § 116, at 841.
5° Chiarella v. Passant, 343 Pa. Super. 330, 341 n.5, 494 A.2d 1109, 1115 n.5 (1985).
57
 Rutherford v. Paddock, 180 Mass, 280, 203, 62 N.E. 381, 382 (1902).
" Liguori v. Republican Co., 8 Mass. App. Ct. 671, 674, 396 N.E.2d 726, 728-29 (1979).
" 8 Mass. App. Ct. 671, 673, 396 N.E.2d 720, 728 (1979).
"" Id. at 673-74, 396 N.E.2c1 at 728.
"I Id. at 674, 396 N.E.2c1 at 728 (quoting Whitcomb v. Hearst Corp., 329 Mass. 193, 190, 107
N.E.2d 295, 299 (1956)).
62
 406 A.2d 533 (Del. 1985).
63 Id. at 555-56.
64 Id. at 556.
65 Id.
6" Id. at 555.
67 Id. at 557.
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occasions." Therefore, the court concluded, the defamation was more damaging to the
plaintiff than the truth, so the substantial truth defense did not apply."
A final example demonstrating the boundaries of the "slight inaccuracies" approach
to the substantial truth defense is illustrated by Prahl v. Brosmale. 7° In Prahl, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court cautioned that "the 'substantial truth' doctrine cannot sanitize a single,
but glaring falsehood in a series of otherwise true statements." 71 In Prahl, a television
reporter showed scenes of police storming a scientist's house and arresting the scientist
after some boys told the police that the scientist shot at them. 72 The scientist was never
charged with any crime, but the reporter stated over the air that the scientist was charged
with reckless use of' a firearm." The court found that charging someone with a crime,
when in fact no criminal charges were ever brought, is a blatant error. 74 Despite the
accuracy of the remainder of the broadcast, the court concluded that the challenged
broadcast was not substantially true."
In summary, the majority approach to applying the substantial truth defense, the
"slight inaccuracies" approach, does not protect statements that deviate far from the
literal truth. Under this approach, only minor inaccuracies in expression or mistakes in
insignificant details excuse a defendant from liability. If the defendant incorrectly reports
details that would affect a reader or listener, such as incorrectly identifying an innocent
person as a criminal despite the accuracy of the remaining communication, or leaving
out a detail that might reasonably lessen the defamatory impact of a statement, courts
will refuse to apply the "slight inaccuracies" interpretation of the substantial truth defense
to excuse the defendant's mistake.
2. The "Exaggeration" Approach to the Substantial Truth Defense
By the 1930s, some courts had begun to broaden the original application or the
substantial truth defense. Instead of restricting the defense to minor inaccuracies in
expression, courts began to allow the exaggeration of a defamatory charge to act as the
substantial truth of the charge." In Fort Worth Press Co. v. Davis, for example, the court
deemed that the newspaper's accusation that the plaintiff wasted $80,000 of taxpayer
. money was substantially true when the defendant publisher was able to prove conclusively
that the plaintiff wasted $17,500. 77 The court reasoned that no greater opprobrium was
attached to the greater amount; the gist of the defamation was wasting the money."
Several jurisdictions continue to apply this "exaggeration" approach to determine
whether a statement is substantially true." In the 1977 case of Downer v. Amalgamated
6" id. at 558.
6" See id. at 557-58.
n 98 Wis. 2d 130, 295 N.W.2d 768 (1980).
71 Id. at 141, 295 N.W.2d at 776.
72 Id. at 133-36, 295 N.W.2d at 772-73.
"Id. at 136, 295 N.W.2d at 773.
74 Id. at 141, 295 N W.2d at 776.
7 ' See id.
7 ' See, e.g., Fort Worth Press Co. v. Davis, 96 S.W.2d 416 (1936).
" Id. at 419.
7" Id.
79 This note uses the label "exaggeration" approach to describe all the cases in this category
because all involve situations in which the defendant exaggerated a detail. Courts apply the sub-
stantial truth defense on the rationale that the exaggeration does not produce a different effect on
the mind of the average reader or listener.
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Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen of North America, for example, the court held that proof
that the plaintiff misappropriated $840.73 of union funds established the substantial
truth of the defendant's accusation that he stole $2,187.77. 8" The court determined that
the damage to the plaintiff's reputation resulted from the charge of stealing union
funds, not from stealing a specific amount of union funds."
A recent Vermont case, Weisburgh a Mahady, also follows this more expansive view'
of the substantial truth defense. 82 The court found that a charge that the plaintiff was
arrested for receiving $50,000 in stolen property was substantially true when the actual
sum was only about $500. 83 The court reasoned that the sting of the charge was receiving
stolen property." The amount of stolen property, the court concluded, would not change
the effect on the mind of the reader. 85 Similarly, in Turnbull v. Herald Co., a publisher
successfully defended a defamation action even when it could prove that the police
found only a few hundred dollars worth of jewelry during a police raid on the plaintiff's
house instead of "thousands of dollars" worth of jewelry. 8" The court concluded that the
gist of the newspaper account was the description of the arrest and that the inaccuracies
in the jewelry's value would not affect the reader differently than would the literal
truth."
This "exaggeration" approach to the substantial truth defense also is used in cases
involving exaggeration of details other than the value of stolen goods or money. In an
early case from the prohibition era, one court held that proving that the plaintiff was
arrested for illegally possessing beer and wine was sufficient to show the substantial truth
of a newspaper account stating that the plaintiff was arrested for illegally possessing
tequila and whiskey, as well as beer and wine." The court reasoned that the "gist" of
the accusation was the arrest for illegal possession of intoxicants, and that proof of arrest
for possession of wine and beer established the truth of the charge, since this was just
as much an offense as possession of tequila and whiskey. 89
Not all exaggeration cases, however, are protected under the substantial truth de-
fense. In the 1982 case of Kohn v. West Hawaii Today, Inc., a newspaper truthfully reported
that a grand jury issued twenty-two indictments for promotion of dangerous drugs
including heroin, cocaine, hashish, and morphine. 98 The plaintiff's store was listed as
one of the locations where the drugs were confiscated, although, in reality, police found
only six grains of marijuana at the store. 81 The Hawaii Supreme Court found no reason
to overturn a jury verdict for the plaintiff, reasoning that the jury reasonably could
conclude that an allegation of promoting the dangerous drugs listed in the article carried
a far greater stigma than possessing a small amount of marijuana. 92
" 550 S.W.2d 744, 747 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977).
xi Id.
Weisburgh v. Malady, 147 Vt. 70, 511 A.2d 304 (1986),
" Id. at	 511 A.2d at 306.
"' Id. at	 511 A.2d at 306.
" Id. at	 511 A.2d at 306.
" 459 S.W.2d 516, 519 (Mo. Ct., App. 1970),
87 Id.
" Lundberg v. Brownsville Publishing Co„ 66 S.W.2d 375 (Tex. Civ, App. 1933).
"Id. at 376.
v" 65 flaw. 584, 585, 656 P.2d 79, 80 (1982).
9 ' hi.
"2 Id. at 591, 656 P.2d at 84.
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In summary, some courts have expanded the substantial truth defense to apply to
cases in which the value of goods or money stolen by the plaintiff has been exaggerated
by media defendants. The jurisdictions applying this approach reason that the average
reader or listener is affected more by the fact that the plaintiff stole than by the value
of the goods or money in question. Consequently, under this approach, defendants may
establish the substantial truth defense notwithstanding the fact that the defamatory
statement contains more than a minor inaccuracy.
3. The "Shihab" Approach to the Substantial Truth Defense"
Recently, one jurisdiction laid the framework for expanding the substantial truth
defense beyond the exaggeration approach. In the 1980 case of Shihab v. Express -News
Corp., 94
 the Texas Court of Civil Appeals modified the exaggeration approach the Texas
courts consistently had used in applying the defense." The Shihab court allowed proof
of' different, although equally opprobrious, wrongdoings to establish the substantial truth
defense.
In Shihab, a newspaper publisher claimed that one of his former journalists fabri-
cated two particular articles." The journalist brought a defamation action against his
former employer. 97
 The newspaper successfully defended the claim even though the
publisher could prove only that the journalist fabricated a third article but not the two
articles the publisher previously identified."
The Shihab court stated that the difference between the misconduct charged and
the misconduct proved should be disregarded if no different effect is produced in the
minds of the average reader or listener.99
 Using this interpretation of the substantial
truth defense, the court found that no more opprobrium attaches to the fabrication of
one newspaper article than would attach to the fabrication of a different article.m
Furthermore, the court explained that the "gist" or "sting" of the accusation was the
claim of fabrication, thus the allegation that the plaintiff fabricated two stories produced
the same effect in the mind of the average reader as would a claim that plaintiff fabricated
a third story, or a claim that plaintiff fabricated stories in genera1. 1 " 1
The court noted that this result differs from the result that would be reached under
the approach of Dean Prosser.'" Under the Prosser approach, the court stated, the
9] This note labels this approach to applying the substantial truth defense the "Shihab" approach
following the decision by the Texas Civil Court of Appeals in Shihab v. Express -News Corp., 604
S.W.2d 204 (Tex. Civ, App. 1980).
94
 Shihab v. Express-News Corp., 604 S.W.2d 204, 205-06 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980).
96 See, e.g., Downer, 550 S.W.2d 744, 747; Lundberg, 66 S.W.2d 375, 376.
9" Shihab, 604 S.W.2d at'205-06.
97 Id. at 205.
" Id, at 206.
99 Id. at 208. The court stated that:
The critical test should be whether the defamation, as published, would effect the
mind of the reader or listener in a different manner than would the misconduct
proved. If the effect on the mind of the recipient would be the same, any variance
between the misconduct charged and the misconduct proved should be disregarded.
Id.
160 td. at 207.
lin Id.
' 42 Id. at 206.
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substantial truth defense would not apply to situations similar to Shihab because the
accusations of a different act would have a different effect on the mind of the reader.m
The Shihab court, however, explained that this view of substantial truth sometimes leads
to illogical results.w4
 To illustrate this, the court used the example that if' someone
claimed that "X murdered A' or that "X is a murderer," the same effect is produced in
the mind of the listener. 105
 Under current interpretations of the defense, the Shihab
court explained, in the first example the defendant would have to prove that X did
murder A in order to establish the substantial truth of the statement, but the defendant
could defend the second scenario merely by showing proof that X murdered anyone.i°6
According to the Shihab court, however, proof that X murdered B should justify the
statement that X murdered A, assuming that no special circumstances made murdering
A more reprehensible than murdering B. 107 The Shihab approach thus reaches the correct
result — that the identity of the murder victim is unimportant — by focusing instead
on the effect of the concededly inaccurate statement on the mind of the recipient.
In summary, the substantial truth defense developed out of the early English com-
mon law actions of civil and criminal defamation. In its earliest application, the defense
excused minor inaccuracies of expression because courts reasoned that such mistakes of
insignificant detail made no difference to the average reader or listener. Some courts
expanded the defense to include exaggerations of the details of misconduct. Courts
concluded that details such as the value of stolen merchandise produced no different
effect on the reader or listener. Rather, these courts noted, the defamatory effect resulted
from the charge of committing the misconduct. More recently, the Texas Civil Court of
Appeals established a broader approach, claiming that any differences between the
misconduct charged and the truth should be ignored if there is no different effect in
the mind of the average reader or listener. Instead of focusing on the statement's
accuracy, this court stated, courts should focus on the statement'i effect on the recipient.
Today, all of these approaches to determining whether the substantial truth defense is
applicable exist in the United States.
II. BROADENING THE APPLICATION OF THE SUBSTANTIAL TRUTH DEFENSE
The substantial truth defense to civil defamation charges had developed in a liberal
manner. The reach of the defense has broadened from including such minor misstate-
ments as incorrectly describing the color of a horse, 108 to including accusations of a
different., although similar, bad act.' 09
 This latter approach to applying the substantial
truth defense, recognized by the Shihab court, is a logical result. of the historical expansion
of the defense and should be uniformly adopted by all courts for at least two reasons.
10 ' See generally PROSSER, supra note f, at § 116.
Shihab, 609 S.W.2d at 208.
105 Id.
1011
'"' See id. The Shihab approach is consistent with the approach taken by the Restatement
(Second) of "forts. Even though the identity of the murder victim might be considered a significant
detail, the Restatement only rejects the substantial truth defense where the misconduct is
substantially chi ferent kind than the misconduct charged. See RESTATEMENT, mpra note 3, at § 581A
comment
1 " Jackson v. Ph tsburgh Times, 152 Pa, 406, 25 A. 613 (1893). See also supra note 49 and
accompanying text..
1 01 See Shihab, 604 S.W.2d 204. See also supra notes 95-107 and accompanying text.
782	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 29:769
First, this expansion is significant in protecting important first amendment freedoms."G
A broad substantial truth approach safeguards these rights by protecting defendants
who honestly make mistakes that cause no greater damage than the truth. Second,
expanding the substantial truth defense to include inaccurate yet equally opprobrious
actions is consistent with the substantive scope of the tort of defamation because it
focuses on whether a challenged statement has damaged the plaintiff's reputation in the
minds of readers or listeners. Thus, the necessity of maintaining strong first amendment
freedoms and the recognition that a broad substantial truth defense is consistent with
substantive law supports a broad application of the substantial truth defense.
Courts long have recognized the first amendment concerns that must be protected
in defamation actions."' The Supreme Court has established the need to balance the
individual's interest in guarding society's first amendment rights, especially the rights of
freedom of speech and the press." 2
 Although the Court has acknowledged the impor-
tance of a person's reputation, the Court nevertheless has emphasized that it is essential
to protect the rights of the media.' 13
The Supreme Court has stated that the media serves two important roles in our
society: it educates the population about current issues and events and also acts as a
watchdog on the government. 14
 The Court has recognized that the media must be
allowed some margin of error in reporting facts if it is to perform this function in
society.'" The time pressures involved in rapidly disseminating large quantities of in-
formation make it impossible to avoid occasional mistakes. 110 The Court has noted that
without this margin of error in reporting information, the important roles of the media
may be undercut because the media may resort to self-censorship out of fear of being
unable to prove adequately the truth of every statement."'
The media's fear of self-censorship is not unfounded. The costs of defending a
defamation action, as well as the risks of being unable to prove substantial truth under
the current restrictive approaches, are great." 8
 In recent years, media defamation liti-
gation has gained widespread attention both because of the staggering damages re-
quested by plaintiffs and the equally staggering damages juries are willing to award."G
The natural bias of juries toward the individual and against the media render defamation
"0 See, e.g., Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 152 (1967); New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964); Pierce v. Capital Cities Communications, Inc., 576 F.2d 495,
497 (3d. Cir. 1978).
'" See, e.g., Pierce, 576 F.2d at 496-97.
New York Times, 376 U.S. 254. See also Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974);
Brats, 388 U.S. at 153.
115
 See generally New York Times, 376 U.S. at 269-70.
"4 See, e.g., id. at 269; Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957).
" 5 E.g., Butts, 388 U.S. at 148; New York Times, 376 U.S. at 271-72.
"6
 New York Times, 376 U.S. at 271.
" 7 See Butts, 388 U.S. at 152; New York Times, 376 U.S. at 271-72, 279.
15 Pierce, 576 F.2d at 506-07.
19 See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 349; R. SMOLLA, SUING THE PRESS 3-6 (1986); Smolla, Let the Author
Beware: The Rejuvenation of the American Law of Libel, 132 U. l'A, L. REv, 1, 2-4 (1983) [hereinafter
Stnolla, Let the Author Beware]. In both of Professor Sn ►olla's works, he lists actions in which plaintiffs
sought large damage awards — in some cases, in excess of $100 million. While judgments have not
reached such heights, many awards enter the multi-million dollar range. SUING THE PRESS, supra,
at 6. Furthermore, this trend in large damage awards is followed by a trend toward settling many
defamation actions at great cost to the media. See Smolla, Let the Author Beware, supra, at 4.
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defenses even more important to the media defendant. 122 A broad substantial truth
approach would not only allow room for inevitable errors, but would help counteract
the strong anti-media sentiment which promotes media self'-censorship.
An expanded approach to applying the substantial truth defense also is supported
by substantive defamation law; that is, the plaintiff should be compensated only if' his
or her reputation is damaged in the estimation of others.'" Thus, if the plaintiff's
reputation is affected the same by the truth as by the challenged statement — even if
the challenged statement imputes a separate act to the plaintiff — then no damages
should be awarded. 122 When courts first adopted the substantial truth defense, they were
willing to assume that minor inaccuracies or exaggerations of the same act produced no
different an effect on the mind of the recipient.'" Because the focus is on the statement's
effect on the recipient, however, the defense should he broadened to include any state-
ments that produce the same effect as the truth. Therefore, the approach taken by the
Shihab court, where somewhat different but equally opprobrious actions satisfied the
defense, is consistent with substantive defamation law.
The development of the varying approaches to the substantial truth defense reflects
a broadening scope to the defense. One hundred years ago courts were not willing to
deviate far front the literal truth requirement.'" While these courts did look to the
defamatory effect of a statement, they focused more on the technical accuracy of a
challenged phrase. The analysis of the defamatory effect of the challenged statement
was merely a common sense conclusions that no one cared if a horse was white or bay
for the purposes of defamation. 122 Likewise, misuse of technical terms, such as substi-
tuting larceny for burglary, fell under substantial truth protection because courts con-
cluded that the distinction between the two terms was lost on the average person. 1211
The exaggeration approach to substantial truth represents a more expansive view
by courts than the slight inaccuracies interpretation of the defense. This approach
examines more squarely the effect on the reader or listener. In a typical case, such as
where a media account of a theft exaggerates the amount of money or goods taken,
courts have found the more-than-slightly inaccurate description of the value unimpor-
tant. 127 The real sting of the defamation is the account of the arrest and the fact that
the defamed person committed the bad act. The details about value do not affect. the
reputational damage created by the true information that the plaintiff committed the
bad act.
The Shihab court's approach moves beyond the exaggeration standard because the
court focuses less on the statement's technical inaccuracies and more on the statement's
1211 See Snsolla, Let the Author Beware, ,supra note 119, at 4-7. SinoIla discusses several studies
conducted in the last decade on trends in defamation law. According to Professor SmoRa, these
studies show that juries were overwhelmingly more plaintiff-oriented than judges. hi. at 5. In fact.,
Professor Smolla noted that. use study showed that appellate courts affirmed seventy-five percent
of the appeals in favor of defendants. 14. at 5-6. Furthermore, in the majority of cases where a
plaintiff's judgment was affirmed, appellate courts generally reduced the damage awards granted
by the trial courts. Id at 5.
' 2 ' See supra notes 3-7 and accompanying text.
122 See generally Shihab, 604 S.W.2d at 207,
122 See supra notes 43-92 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 43-48 and accompanying text.
122 Connor v. Standard Publishing Co., 183 Mass. 474,477-78,67 N.E. 596,597 (1903).
L22 See supra text accompanying notes 53-54.
17 See generally text accompanying notes 44-92 for a discussion of exaggeration cases,
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effect on the minds of the readers or listeners. 12" This court carried the examination of
the effect on the average reader or listener toward its logical conclusion; that is, if' the
statement's effect on the reader is the same, any difference between the literal truth and
the inaccurate statement should be disregarded even if the action charged is different
than the actual action and the statement is more than slightly inaccurate.
Although the Shihab court stated that it was following the exaggeration approach
consistently used by Texas courts,t 29 the facts of Shihab indicate that the court went
beyond the typical exaggeration approach. According to the court, instead of exagger-
ating the details about a story the plaintiff did fabricate, the defendant in Shihab claimed
that the plaintiff fabricated two totally different articles.'" The court noted that the
reasoning of the exaggeration cases did not necessitate a finding that the reach of the
substantial truth defense is limited to misconduct included in the accusation.' 3 ' Thus,.
they concluded that similar misconduct outside of the accusation was included within
the substantial truth defense.
The Shihab court's approach in including different acts under the substantial truth
defense provokes two important questions: first, how different an action can be from
the literal truth before it is no longer substantially true, and second, how the court can
determine when the statement reaches this level of difference and has had a different
effect on the mind of the average reader. The substantial truth defense should not be
expanded to a point where a defendant could print any defamatory statement he or she
wanted so long as he or she could provide proof of some equally opprobrious action.
Rather, the defense should be limited by the constitutional rule that only accidental or
negligent misstatements are protected. 132 As the Supreme Court has reasoned, statements
published with intentional or reckless disregard for truth or falsity deserve no protection
under the first amendment. 133 Therefore, the substantial truth defense would be available
only to defendants who unintentionally publish less than accurate, but not intentionally
or negligently false, statements.
Courts are still left with the difficult question, however, of determining how different
or inaccurate a statement can be before it is no longer substantially true. While this is
an important point, there is always a question of how far any standard in the law can
be pushed before it becomes unworkable. Obviously, no one would equate the sting of
a false murder accusation with that of a true petty theft conviction, But can a distinction
be drawn between a charge of rape and that of child molestation? The best people to
draw this distinction and decide if these actions produce equal reputational damage are
the average readers and listeners, the jury.'"
The media defendant generally raises the substantial truth defense on a motion for
directed verdict or summary judgment.' 33 There may be situations where the challenged
' 28 See Shihab, 604 S.W.2d at 208.
129 See id. at 206-07.
' 30 Id. at 207.
"I See id. Further, the court pointed out that the decision or Quaid v. Tipton supports a holding
that proof of different bad acts will raise the substantial truth defense. See id. at 207-08.
' 32
 New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279-80.
133 Id.
See supra note 42. Courts already recognize that the question of a statement's substantial
truth is best left to the jury except where the facts clearly indicate that summary judgment is
appropriate.
" 	 Fendler V. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 130 Ariz. 475,478,636 l'.2d 1257,1260 (Ariz.
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statement is so close to the truth that the judge properly can decide whether the statement
is substantially true. But because the defense turns on the effect on the average reader's
mind, factual questions concerning any misstatements that move beyond a minor inac-
curacy should be left for the jury.'m
The jury is the appropriate factfinder in this situation because the jury represents
the average reader or listener. The jury is in the best position to determine whether the
opprobrium attached to the alleged misstatement is similar to the opprobrium attached
to the act actually committed. Each member of the jury can decide personally how he
or she would react as an average recipient of the allegedly defamatory statement. While
this may not be an easy task, juries often are called upon to make difficult factual
decisions. Accordingly, it is well within the jury's ability to determine whether a different
but equally opprobrious act has the same effect On the plaintiff's reputation as the truth.
In summary, a broad standard of substantial truth carries the examination of the
defamatory effect on the reader or listener to its logical conclusion by allowing even
different actions to fall under the substantial truth defense. Not only does a broad
approach to the substantial truth defense aid in the essential maintenance of first amend-
ment freedoms, but this approach is consistent with substantive defamation law. A broad
approach is consistent with current law because a defamation action only provides
recovery when a plaintiff has suffered actual reputational damage. If the plaintiff com-
mitted a bad act equally as opprobrious as the act charged, then no reputational damage
has occurred and no damages should be awarded. The difficult question of determining
the effect on a reader or listener can be handled by the jury, which best represents the
average reader or listener.
CONCt.USION
The substantial truth defense developed out of early defamation law both from a
recognition of the media's first amendment rights and a recognition that the media
inevitably would make insignificant mistakes in publishing information. The first courts
to apply the substantial truth defense determined that slight inaccuracies in immaterial
facts would not affect the average reader or listener enough to render the statement
false. As the defense developed, courts recognized that the defamatory "sting" of a
statement lay in the charge of misconduct, for example, stealing, and not in such
inaccuracies as the exaggerated description of the value of stolen goods. More recently,
the Shawl) court correctly broadened the substantial truth defense by claiming that any
differences between the misconduct charged and the truth should be ignored if the
inaccurate statement. produces the same effect. as the literal truth in the mind of the
recipient.
This note urges that all courts adopt the approach to substantial truth taken by the
Shihrtb court, This approach would encompass situations involving slightly inaccurate or
exaggerated facts recognized under the current approaches as well as include situations
Ct. App, 1981); Hovey v. Iowa State Daily Publications Bd., Inc., 372 N.W.2c1 253,256 (Iowa 1985);
jadwin v. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 390 N.W.2d 437,443 (Minn. App. 1986). Because the
establishment of the substantial truth defense precludes examination of constitutional actual malice
concerns, see supra note 34, the defendant has incentive to raise this defense on a motion for directed
verdict or sun unary judgment.
001
 This result comports with current defianation law. See supra note 42 and accompanying text
for a discussion or how the question of substantial truth is generally one or fact fur the jury.
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involving separate actions imputed to plaintiffs. The Shihab approach helps protect
essential first amendment freedoms by providing the media with "breathing space" to
publish occasionally inaccurate information. This approach also is consistent with the
policy behind defamation law because it awards damages to plaintiffs only when the
inaccurate statement produces more reputational damage than would the literal truth.
The judicial system already provides an answer for the difficult question raised by the
Shihab approach; that is, how the factfinder will be able to decide whether a reader or
listener is affected differently by a challenged statement. The jury, which best represents
the average reader or listener in our judicial system, can best decide how far a statement
may deviate from the truth and still remain substantially true.
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